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High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) allows two parties to generate multiple
secure bits of information per detected photon. In this work, we show that decoy state protocols
can be practically implemented for HD-QKD using only one or two decoy states. HD-QKD with
two decoy states, under realistic experimental constraints, can generate multiple secure bits per
coincidence at distances over 200 km and at rates similar to those achieved by a protocol with infinite
decoy states. Furthermore, HD-QKD with only one decoy state is practical at short distances, where
it is almost as secure as a protocol with two decoy states. HD-QKD with only one or two decoy
states can therefore be implemented to optimize the rate of secure quantum communications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex, 42.65.Lm
I. INTRODUCTION
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-
QKD), using qudits of dimensions d > 2, enables its par-
ticipants to optimize the secret-key capacity of a bosonic
channel under technical constraints [1]. When the secret-
key generation rate is limited by the rate at which Alice
generates photons or by the rate at which Bob can de-
tect photons due to the detector dead time, the secret-
key generation rate can be improved by high-dimensional
photon encoding where each photon can encode as much
as log2 d > 1 bits of information. Moreover, HD-QKD
protocols may tolerate more noise than two-level, or
qubit [2–4], QKD protocols [5].
Discrete HD-QKD protocols have been proven to be
secure against coherent attacks, in which Eve is allowed
to interact with all signals simultaneously [6, 7]. Vari-
ous photonic degrees of freedom have been investigated
for HD-QKD, including position-momentum [1], time-
energy [8–12], transverse momentum [13], and orbital an-
gular momentum [14–17]. Among these, the time-energy
basis is particularly attractive because time-energy cor-
relations are compatible with wavelength-division mul-
tiplexing (WDM) systems and are robust in both free-
space and fiber-based transmissions.
Recently, HD-QKD protocols employing time-energy
entanglement have been proven to be secure against col-
lective attacks, in which Eve’s apparatus, which can in-
clude quantum memory, is restricted to interact with
each signal separately [18, 19]. (The bounds for uncon-
ditional security for both coherent and collective attacks
turn out to be identical for most protocols [20].) The
proofs in [18, 19] use the time-frequency covariance ma-
trix (similar to the one used in continuous-variable QKD
protocols [21–23]) to derive a lower bound on the secure-
key rate under collective attacks. The time-frequency
covariance matrix can be measured using dispersive op-
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tics [18, 24] or Franson interferometers [19, 25]. The time-
energy entanglement of photon pairs produced by sponta-
neous parametric down conversion (SPDC) has also been
harnessed in several HD-QKD experiments [8, 11, 26].
All these experiments assume single-pair emissions
from the SPDC source, whereas multi-pair emissions do
occur. For a continuous-wave source, the signal and idler
from each signal-idler mode pair are individually in iden-
tical thermal states with average photon numbers that
are much smaller than 1. Therefore, when the HD-QKD
frame time does not greatly exceed the source’s correla-
tion time, multi-pair emissions occurring during a par-
ticular frame will tend to be correlated in time, an effect
known as photon bunching [27]. In such cases, when
any of these HD-QKD protocols is performed via a lossy
channel, it is vulnerable to the photon number splitting
(PNS) attack. On the other hand, when the frame time
is much greater than the correlation time, the number
of photon pairs emitted in a frame will be Poisson dis-
tributed, hence no photon bunching is then expected.
Nevertheless, a PNS attack can provide Eve with some
information about Alice and Bob’s measurements when
they reconcile their results via classical communication
that Eve can monitor.
In the PNS attack, Eve measures the photon number of
each transmission and selectively suppresses single pho-
ton signals [28–31]. She then splits multiphoton signals—
keeping one copy to herself and sending the other copy
to Bob. Under the collective attack scheme, Eve stores
her photons in a quantum memory and only measures
them after Bob publishes his measurement bases over a
public channel. She takes advantage of the timing cor-
relations in the bunched photons to acquire information
about Alice and Bob’s key without being detected.
The decoy state protocol is designed to detect the
PNS attack [32]. The central idea is to test the channel
transmission properties by varying the source intensity.
Decoy-state QKD has been discussed extensively in the
context of Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [33–
36]. In addition, several experiments have demonstrated
the generation of secure bits over 144 km in free space [37]
and over 107 km in optical fiber [38]. Furthermore, it
has been shown that decoy states can also be generated
passively by using a beam splitter or by monitoring the
idler of an SPDC source [39–45]. Recently, decoy-state
analysis was extended to HD-QKD protocols [19], but for
an infinite number of decoy states, which is practically
impossible.
Here, we analyze the security of HD-QKD protocols
employing a practical number of decoy states. Unlike the
BB84 decoy-state QKD protocol, we make use of the de-
crease in measurement correlations instead of the quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER) to estimate the amount of
information gained by Eve. As a consequence, we find
that the two-decoy-state protocol with one vacuum de-
coy state, which provides the best secure-key rate for
BB84 [35], is not optimal for HD-QKD.
The analysis presented here answers a pressing ques-
tion for experimental implementations of HD-QKD: how
many decoy states are necessary for HD-QKD protocols
to be robust against the PNS attack? We show by numer-
ical evaluations, assuming realistic experimental parame-
ters, that the security of a protocol with two decoy states
approaches that of a protocol with an infinite number of
decoy states. HD-QKD with only two decoy states can
therefore be used to maximize the rate of high-speed se-
cure quantum communications under experimental con-
straints.
We shall focus our discussion on a specific HD-QKD
scheme: the dispersive optics QKD (DO-QKD) proto-
col [18, 46, 47], which employs group velocity disper-
sion to transform between mutually unbiased time and
frequency bases. Although we restrict our analysis to
DO-QKD, the same arguments are also applicable to
other HD-QKD protocols employing time-energy entan-
glement.
This work is organized as follows: Sec. II briefly re-
views the DO-QKD protocol. Sec. III outlines the general
decoy-state protocol. We discuss the relevant parameters
that can be measured by Alice and Bob during quantum
communication. In addition, we present a lower bound
on the secure-key capacity when an infinite number of
decoy states is available to Alice and Bob. Sec. IV de-
rives a new lower bound on the secure-key capacity when
only two decoy states are employed, and Sec. V considers
the case of a single decoy state. Sec. VI presents a lower
bound on the secure-key capacity when no decoy state is
employed. The results of a numerical evaluation with re-
alistic experimental constraints are presented in Sec. VII.
We defer the calculation of mutual information between
Alice and Bob and the calculation of Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation to Appendices A and B.
II. DISPERSIVE OPTICS QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
In the DO-QKD protocol, illustrated in Fig. 1, Alice
weakly pumps an SPDC source such that the time-energy
entangled output state when only one pair is emitted can
be approximated to have a Gaussian envelope [26]:
ψ(tA, tB) ∝ e−(tA−tB)
2/4σ2
core−(tA+tB)
2/16σ2
coh . (1)
Here, σcoh is the coherence time of the pump field, and
σcor is the correlation time between the two photons gen-
erated by the SPDC source. σcoh typically can be longer
than a microsecond for a diode laser, and σcor is typically
on the order of picoseconds for typical SPDC sources [48].
The number of alphabet characters per photon pulse,
d = σcoh/σcor (the Schmidt number), therefore can be
large [11, 49].
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FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of the DO-QKD setup. Alice
and Bob randomly choose to measure in either the arrival-
time basis or the frequency basis. In case 1, Alice measures
in the frequency basis by applying a normal dispersion (ND).
Bob’s measurement is only anti-correlated to Alice’s if he also
measures in the frequency basis by applying an anomalous
dispersion (AD). In case 2, Alice measures in the arrival-time
basis, and Bob’s measurement is only correlated to Alice’s if
he also measures in the arrival-time basis.
Alice and Bob randomly choose to measure their pho-
tons in the conjugate bases of photon arrival time and
photon frequency; the two bases are measured using a
fast single-photon detector or a dispersive optical element
followed by photodetection, respectively. We assume that
Alice and Bob have complete control of their own setups,
precluding tampering by any third party such as Eve. In
a single measurement frame, if both Alice and Bob mea-
sure their photons in the arrival-time basis, their timing
measurements will be correlated. Similarly, if both par-
ties measure in the frequency basis, their measurements
will be anti-correlated. On the other hand, if one party
measures in the frequency basis while the other measures
in the arrival-time basis, the timing correlation between
their photons is severely diminished.
After the measurement stage, Alice and Bob sift for
frames in which both of them registered at least one de-
tection event. For any frame with more than one coinci-
dence, Alice and Bob replace their detection events with a
random variable whose probability distribution matches
that of photons originating from single-pair emissions.
Finally, they apply error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation to establish identical secret keys.
The DO-QKD protocol is not prone to the PNS attack
when it is performed using an on-demand single photon
source. When such a photon source is used, the bound on
the secure-key capacity of a DO-QKD protocol, in terms
of bits per photon-pair coincidence (bpc), is [23, 50]
∆I > βI(A;B)− χUBξt,ξω (A;E), (2)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency and I(A;B) is the
mutual information between Alice and Bob. χUBξt,ξω (A;E)
is an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information under col-
lective attacks, given the excess-noise factors ξt and ξω for
the timing and the frequency correlations, respectively.
Eve’s attack on Alice’s transmission degrades the cor-
relations of Alice and Bob’s measurements in a man-
ner parameterized by the excess-noise factors. Explicitly,
Var[T ′A−T ′B] = (1+ξt)Var[TA−TB] and Var[Ω′A+Ω′B] =
(1 + ξω)Var[ΩA + ΩB], where TA (TB) and ΩA (ΩB)
are the random variables associated with Alice’s (Bob’s)
time and frequency measurements without Eve’s pres-
ence. The corresponding primed variables are the ran-
dom variables after Eve’s intrusion. The sign difference
is a consequence of Alice and Bob’s timing measurements
being directly correlated while their frequency measure-
ments are anti-correlated. These excess-noise factors al-
low us to place an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation.
III. GENERAL DECOY STATE PROTOCOL
A. Postselection probability
We consider the practical case of interest for SPDC-
based HD-QKD systems, i.e., we assume a continuous-
wave source operating at low brightness (signal and idler
beams have average photon numbers per mode much less
than 1) with a frame time that greatly exceeds the cor-
relation time. In this case, the photon-pair statistics are
approximately Poissonian [51, 52]. Suppose that Alice’s
SPDC source emits an average of λ pairs per measure-
ment frame, the probability Prn of emitting n-photon
pairs in a single measurement frame is then
Prn =
λn
n!
e−λ. (3)
Furthermore, the postselection probability, which is the
probability of Alice and Bob registering at least one de-
tection (due to a photon or a dark count) in a single
measurement frame, can be written as
Pλ =
∞∑
n=0
PrnCn =
∞∑
n=0
λn
n!
e−λCn, (4)
where Cn is the conditional probability of measuring at
least one detection given n-photon pairs are emitted. Ex-
plicitly, in Eve’s absence we have
Cn = [1− (1 − ηA)n(1 − pd)]
× [1− (1 − ηBηP )n(1− pd)] .
(5)
Here, ηA and ηB are Alice and Bob’s detector efficiencies,
ηP is the transmittance of the quantum channel linking
Alice’s source to Bob’s terminal, and pd is the proba-
bility of one dark count in a single measurement frame.
We are neglecting the possibility of multiple dark counts
occurring in a frame because the product of the frame
duration and the dark count rate for a typical supercon-
ducting nanowire single-photon detectors is much smaller
than 1 [53]. Eve, in principle, has the freedom to affect
the Cn values. The goal of the decoy state protocol is to
estimate the Cn values from the postselection probabili-
ties of different choices of λ.
B. Excess noise
Alice and Bob cannot directly measure their timing
and frequency correlations when there are multiphoton
emissions and dark counts. They can only measure the
averaged correlations:
Var[T ′A − T ′B]λ = FλVar[T ′A − T ′B] + (1− Fλ) ∆σ2t ,
Var[Ω′A +Ω
′
B]λ = FλVar[Ω
′
A +Ω
′
B] + (1− Fλ) ∆σ2ω ,
(6)
where Fλ = λe
−λC1/Pλ is the fraction of postselected
events that are due to single photon emissions, and ∆σ2t
(∆σ2ω) is the measured time (dispersed-time) correlations
that are due to measurements of multiphoton emissions
and dark counts.
It is convenient to divide (6) by Var[TA − TB] or
Var[ΩA + ΩB] so that the excess-noise factors ξt and ξω
are explicit:
Ξt,ν = Fλ(1 + ξt) + (1− Fλ) ∆Ξt,
Ξω,ν = Fλ(1 + ξω) + (1− Fλ) ∆Ξω .
(7)
The quantity Ξx,λ (for x = t or ω) is the averaged excess-
noise multiplier, which can be measured by Alice and
Bob.
C. Infinite number of decoy states
Now suppose that Alice and Bob choose a signal state
with an expected photon-pair number µ and decoy states
with expected photon-pair numbers ν1, ν2, . . . , νm. Alice
and Bob can then use the knowledge of the postselection
probabilities P = {Pµ, Pν1 , . . . , Pνm} and the multipliers
K = {Ξx,µ,Ξx,ν1 , . . . ,Ξx,νm} (for x = t and ω) to esti-
mate the values of Cn and ξx.
If we assume that m → ∞, the key length is infinite,
and the values of Cn are linearly independent of each
other, then Alice and Bob can determine the Cn values
to arbitrarily high confidence by measuring the set P .
Similarly, by measuring the set K, they can determine ξx
to arbitrarily high confidence. Therefore, Alice and Bob
can detect any attack by Eve that affects the values of
Cn and ξx [32–34].
The bound on the secure-key capacity with m → ∞
decoy states is [19]
∆I > βI(A;B) − χ′, (8)
where χ′ is the amount of information assumed to be lost
to Eve, defined as
χ′ = (1− Fµ) nR + Fµ χUBξt,ξω(A;E). (9)
Here, Fµ = µe
−µC1/Pµ, and nR is the number of ran-
dom bits shared between Alice and Bob when they use
an error-correcting code employing an average of nECC
syndrome bits, which are revealed over the public chan-
nel. β = (nR − nECC)/I(A;B) is the reconciliation effi-
ciency. We have assumed that Alice and Bob can derive
no security from multiphoton emissions. Note that when
the photon source is an on-demand single photon source
(Fµ = 1), we recover (2).
IV. TWO DECOY STATES
When only a few decoy states are available, Alice and
Bob cannot determine (to arbitrarily high confidence) the
amount of information lost to Eve, χ′. They can, how-
ever, provide a reasonable upper bound to χ′ by using
the following methods:
1. Finding a lower bound on Fµ, which estimates how
close their photon source is to an ideal one, and
2. Finding upper bounds on ξt and ξω, which estimate
Eve’s Holevo information χ(A;E).
We suppose that Alice and Bob choose fewer than three
weak decoy states with mean photon-pair numbers ν1 and
ν2 that satisfy
0 6 ν2 < ν1,
ν1 + ν2 < µ.
(10)
A. Lower bound on Fµ
The postselection probabilities of the two different
states are given by
Pν1 =
∞∑
n=0
Cn
νn1
n!
e−ν1 , (11)
and
Pν2 =
∞∑
n=0
Cn
νn2
n!
e−ν2 . (12)
As shown in [35], we can find a lower bound on C1 from
the difference of the two postselection probabilities:
C1 >
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[
Pν1e
ν1 − Pν2eν2
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Pµe
µ − C0)
]
,
(13)
where the inequality follows from the relation: (ν1/µ)
n−
(ν2/µ)
n 6 (ν1/µ)
2 − (ν2/µ)2 for n > 2 which is true
given (10). The above relation tells us that a lower bound
on C0 is needed to make use of (13). One such bound is
C0 >
ν1Pν2e
ν2 − ν2Pν1eν1
ν1 − ν2 , (14)
which follows from the assumption that ν1 > ν2.
Another lower bound on C0 can be found using the as-
sumption that Eve does not have access to both Alice and
Bob’s experimental setups. Since Alice owns the SPDC
source, Eve cannot tamper with Alice’s measurement of
any output state generated by the source. When the
source emits no photons, Alice’s detector can only regis-
ter a dark count, which occurs with probability pd. Eve
is allowed to do whatever she pleases with the vacuum
state heading towards Bob, such as injecting photons into
the channel. However, whatever she does cannot lower
the probability of Bob registering a count to any value
below pd. Therefore, we conclude
C0 > p
2
d. (15)
Combining (14) and (15) then gives
C0 > C
LB,{ν1,ν2}
0 = max
{
ν1Pν2e
ν2 − ν2Pν1eν1
ν1 − ν2 , p
2
d
}
.
(16)
By using (13) and (16), we find
Fµ = C1
µe−µ
Pµ
>
µ2
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[
Pν1
Pµ
eν1−µ − Pν2
Pµ
eν2−µ
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(
1− C
LB,{ν1,ν2}
0 e
−µ
Pµ
)]
.
(17)
Another way of obtaining a lower bound on Fµ is im-
mediately evident from the postselection probability of a
single decoy state. Let λ = ν1 or ν2 if ν2 6= 0, and λ = ν1
if ν2 = 0. It then follows that
Pλe
λ = C0 + C1λ+
∞∑
n=2
λn
n!
Cn
< C0 + C1λ+
λ2
µ2
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
Cn
= C0 + C1λ+
λ2
µ2
(Pµe
µ − C0 − C1µ) ,
(18)
because λ/µ 6 1. Solving for C1 we obtain
C1 >
µ
µλ− λ2
[
Pλe
λ − λ
2
µ2
Pµe
µ − µ
2 − λ2
µ2
C0
]
, (19)
which is similar to what is found in Ref. [35] using another
method.
Now, we need to upper bound C0 to find the lower
bound of C1. We again assume that Eve cannot intrude
into Alice and Bob’s experimental setups. This implies
that, when Alice’s source emits no photons, Alice and
Bob’s conditional coincidence probability C0 cannot ex-
ceed the dark count probability of Alice’s detectors:
C0 6 C
UB,{ν1,ν2}
0 = pd. (20)
Therefore,
Fµ = C1
µe−µ
Pµ
>
µ2
µλ− λ2
[
Pλ
Pµ
eλ−µ − λ
2
µ2
− µ
2 − λ2
µ2
C
UB,{ν1,ν2}
0 e
−µ
Pµ
]
,
(21)
where λ = ν1 or ν2 if ν2 6= 0, and λ = ν1 if ν2 = 0.
Combining (17) and (21), we get
Fµ > F
LB,{ν1,ν2}
µ
= max
{
µ2
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[
Pν1
Pµ
eν1−µ − Pν2
Pµ
eν2−µ
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(
1− C
LB,{ν1,ν2}
0 e
−µ
Pµ
)]
,
µ2
µλ− λ2
[
Pλ
Pµ
eλ−µ − λ
2
µ2
− µ
2 − λ2
µ2
C
UB,{ν1,ν2}
0 e
−µ
Pµ
]}
,
(22)
where λ = ν1 or ν2 if ν2 6= 0, and λ = ν1 if ν2 = 0.
B. Upper bounds on ξt and ξω
Let (λ1, λ2) ∈ L = {(µ, ν1), (µ, ν2), (ν1, ν2)}. Each
member of L is an ordered pair of two mean photon-
pair numbers. The averaged excess-noise multipliers for
the ordered pair (λ1, λ2) are
Ξx,λ1 = Fλ1(1 + ξx) + ∆Ξx (1− Fλ1 ) ,
Ξx,λ2 = Fλ2(1 + ξx) + ∆Ξx (1− Fλ2 ) .
(23)
Multiplying the above two equations by Pλ1e
λ1 and
Pλ2e
λ2 respectively, we obtain
Ξx,λ1Pλ1e
λ1 = λ1C1(1 + ξx) + ∆Ξx
(
Pλ1e
λ1 − λ1C1
)
,
Ξx,λ2Pλ2e
λ2 = λ2C1(1 + ξx) + ∆Ξx
(
Pλ2e
λ2 − λ2C1
)
.
(24)
To find upper bounds on ξt and ξω, we take the difference
between these two equations,
Ξx,λ1Pλ1e
λ1 − Ξx,λ2Pλ2eλ2
= (λ1 − λ2)C1(1 + ξx)
+ ∆Ξx
(
Pλ1e
λ1 − Pλ2eλ2 − (λ1 − λ2)C1
)
> (λ1 − λ2)C1(1 + ξx),
(25)
where the inequality comes from
Pλ1e
λ1 − Pλ2eλ2 =
∞∑
n=0
λn1 − λn2
n!
Cn
> (λ1 − λ2)C1,
(26)
since λ1 > λ2 for any ordered pair (λ1, λ2) ∈ L. Thus,
(1 + ξx) 6
1
(λ1 − λ2)C1
(
Ξx,λ1Pλ1e
λ1 − Ξx,λ2Pλ2eλ2
)
6
µe−µ
(λ1 − λ2)FLB,{ν1,ν2}µ
×
(
Ξx,λ1
Pλ1
Pµ
eλ1 − Ξx,λ2
Pλ2
Pµ
eλ2
)
,
(27)
for x = t and ω.
Another way to place upper bounds on ξt and ξω is
immediately evident from (7):
Ξx,λ = Fλ (1 + ξx) + (1− Fλ) ∆Ξx
> Fλ(1 + ξx)
=
λPµ
µPλ
eµ−λFµ (1 + ξx)
>
λPµ
µPλ
eµ−λFLB,{ν1,ν2}µ (1 + ξx),
(28)
for λ ∈ {µ, ν1, ν2}. The inequality above implies that
(1 + ξx) 6 min
λ∈{µ,ν1,ν2}
{
eλ−µ
µPλ
λPµ
Ξx,λ
F
LB,{ν1,ν2}
µ
}
. (29)
Combining (27) and (29) gives us
ξx 6 ξ
UB,{ν1,ν2}
x
= min
{
min
(λ1,λ2)∈L
{
µe−µ
(λ1 − λ2)FLB,{ν1,ν2}µ
×
(
Ξx,λ1
Pλ1
Pµ
eλ1 − Ξx,λ2
Pλ2
Pµ
eλ2
)}
,
min
λ∈{µ,ν1,ν2}
{
eλ−µ
µPλ
λPµ
Ξx,λ
F
LB,{ν1,ν2}
µ
}}
− 1.
(30)
Using (17) and (30), we obtain a bound on the secure-
key capacity of HD-QKD using only two decoy states:
∆I >βI(A;B)µ − (1− FLB,{ν1,ν2}µ )nR
− FLB,{ν1,ν2}µ χUBξUB,{ν1,ν2}t ,ξUB,{ν1,ν2}ω (A;E),
(31)
where the subscript µ on I(A;B) indicates that Alice and
Bob’s mutual information is calculated using the signal
state.
V. ONE DECOY STATE
When Alice only uses one decoy state, whose mean
photon-pair number ν is smaller than that of the signal
state µ, we can find a lower bound on Fµ by using (21)
with λ = ν. The argument used to upper bound C0 still
applies because it only depends on the assumption that
Eve cannot intrude into Alice and Bob’s experimental
setups. Therefore,
Fµ > F
LB,{ν}
µ
=
µ2
µν − ν2
[
Pν
Pµ
eν−µ − ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
C
UB,{ν}
0 e
−µ
Pµ
]
,
(32)
with C0 6 C
UB,{ν}
0 = pd.
Similarly, upper bounds on ξt and ξω can be found by
using (30) with (λ1, λ2) = (µ, ν) and λ ∈ {µ, ν}:
ξx 6 ξ
UB,{ν}
x
= min
{
µ
(µ− ν)FLB,{ν}µ
(
Ξx,µ − Pν
Pµ
Ξx,νe
ν−µ
)
,
min
λ∈{µ,ν}
{
eλ−µ
µPλ
λPµ
Ξx,λ
F
LB,{ν}
µ
}}
− 1,
(33)
for x = t and ω.
VI. NO DECOY STATES
When decoy states are not employed, Alice and Bob
must use a fraction of their signal frames to estimate the
transmission parameters. To find a lower bound on Fµ,
consider
Pµe
µ = C0 + C1µ+
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
Cn
6 CUB,∅0 + C1µ+
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
CUB,∅n ,
(34)
where
Cn 6 C
UB,∅
n = 1− (1 − ηA)n(1 − pd), (35)
is a consequence of Eve’s inability to affect Alice’s detec-
tion probability.
Using the relations above, we have
C1 > C
LB,∅
1 =
1
µ
[
Pµe
µ − CUB,∅0 −
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
CUB,∅n
]
,
(36)
and hence
Fµ > F
LB,∅
µ
= CLB,∅1
µe−µ
Pµ
= 1− C
UB,∅
0 e
−µ
Pµ
−
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
CUB,∅n e
−µ
Pµ
.
(37)
Because Ξx,µ is the only available excess-noise multiplier,
the upper bounds on ξt and ξω are found by using (29)
with λ = µ:
ξx 6 ξ
UB,∅
x =
Ξx,µ
FLB,∅µ
− 1, (38)
for x = t and ω.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 2 plots the secure-key capacity of decoy-state
HD-QKD with an SPDC source of mean photon-pair
numbers per frame µ = 0.01, 0.10, and 0.25. The top
panels show the case in which the Schmidt number d = 8
while the bottom panels show the case in which d = 32.
Three different decoy state protocols are plotted in each
panel: the one-decoy-state protocol, the two-decoy-state
protocol, and the infinite-decoy-state protocol. For com-
parison, we also plot the security of HD-QKD protocol
without decoy states.
In particular, we consider the case ν = µ/2 for the
one-decoy-state protocol. For the two-decoy-state proto-
col, we similarly assume ν1 = µ/2, but we optimize ν2
such that, for any particular transmission distance, the
lower bound on the secure-key capacity ∆I is maximized.
Figure 3 plots the optimal values of ν2 as a function of
transmission distance at 10 km increments.
For the cases of µ = 0.10 and 0.25, (21) gives a better
lower bound on Fµ at short distances. The sharp drop
in the optimal values of ν2 (at ∼50 km for µ = 0.10 and
at ∼100 km for µ = 0.25) indicates where (17) starts
to provide a better lower bound on Fµ than (21). On
the other hand, for the cases of µ = 0.01, (17) provides
a better lower bound on Fµ at all distances. Moreover,
the optimal values of ν2 are small compared to µ—but
non-zero. This result is in contrast to the two-decoy-state
BB84 protocol whose lower bound on secure-key capacity
is always maximized when ν2 → 0 [35].
We take σcor = 30 ps for both d values, and σcoh =
dσcor. The frame duration Tf is chosen to be Tf =
2
√
2 ln 2 σcoh. Experimentally, when a larger d is wanted,
it is easier to increase the coherence time σcoh than to de-
crease the correlation time σcor. This is because the σcoh
can be increased by modulating the pulse duration of the
laser pump field. On the other hand, σcor is determined
by the phase-matching bandwidth of the SPDC source
and is characteristic to the parametric down-conversion
process.
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FIG. 2. Lower bounds on the secure-key capacity (in bits per coincidence) of decoy-state HD-QKD as a function of transmission
distance. Top panels show the case d = 8 and bottom panels show the case d = 32. Solid lines with crosses (black) correspond
to HD-QKD with infinite decoy states; solid lines (red) correspond to HD-QKD with two weak decoy states of ν1 = µ/2 and an
optimized ν2; dashed lines (blue) correspond to HD-QKD with only one decoy state of ν = µ/2; and dotted lines (green) show
the performance of HD-QKD without decoy states. For µ = 0.01 and 0.10 (d = 8 and 32), lines for the infinite-decoy-state and
the two-decoy-state protocols are indistinguishable at the plots’ scales.
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FIG. 3. Optimal values of ν2 at different transmis-
sion distances for two-decoy-state protocols with µ =
{0.01, 0.10, 0.25} and ν1 = µ/2.
We assume the following experimental parameters:
propagation loss α = 0.2 dB/km; detector timing jitter
σJ = 20 ps; dark count rate rD = 1000 s
−1; reconcilia-
tion efficiency β = 0.9; nR = log2 d. The transmittance
ηP = 10
−αL/10, where L is the length of the quantum
channel in km. We also assume that Alice and Bob have
the same detector efficiencies: ηA = ηB = 0.93 [53].
For simplicity, we assume equal excess-noise factors for
both the arrival-time and the frequency measurements,
ξt = ξω = ξ. The change in correlation time due to Eve’s
interaction is assumed to be σ∆ =
(√
1 + ξ − 1)×σcor =
10 ps. When Alice and Bob do not use an infinite num-
ber of decoy states, they can only measure Ξµ. For the
calculations, we assume that ∆Ξ = 1+ ξ. Details on cal-
culating Alice and Bob’s mutual information, as well as
Eve’s Holevo information, are outlined in Appendices A
and B.
Using decoy states improves the security of the HD-
QKD protocol. For example, while the case of µ = 0.25
and d = 32 is insecure beyond 25 km without decoy
states, the one-decoy-state protocol is able to generate
0.45 secure bpc at a distance of 100 km. Furthermore,
when two weak decoy states are used, the protocol can
generate more than 0.52 secure bpc up to a distance of
200 km.
Even though the probability of multiphoton emissions
is low for µ = 0.01, we only obtain secure bits up to
a distance of ∼100 km without decoy states. However,
the presence of one decoy state allows us to obtain 1.22
secure bpc for d = 8 and 2.57 secure bpc for d = 32 at the
100 km distance. The two-decoy-state protocols generate
more than 1.26 secure bpc for d = 8 and more than 2.83
secure bpc for d = 32 up to a distance of 200 km.
In Fig. 2, we also see that protocols with two decoy
states perform almost as well as protocols with infinite
decoy states. Intuitively, a protocol with an infinite num-
ber of decoy states should perform the best because an
infinite number of decoy states allows us to estimate
the values of all Cn precisely. Nevertheless, the two-
decoy-state protocols asymptotes to the infinite-decoy-
state protocols, performing only slightly worse in the
generation of secure-bit capacities at similar transmis-
sion distances. When two decoy states are employed, Al-
ice and Bob can find useful lower bounds on C1 and C0
(and hence Fµ). High-dimensional QKD protocols with
two decoy states therefore appear practical as they offer
multiple secure bits per coincidence at distances and at
rates similar to those achieved by a protocol with infinite
decoy states.
The two-decoy-state protocol can reach a longer se-
cure distance than the one-decoy-state protocol. To see
why, consider (4) and (5). Notice that at short distances,
where the transmittance ηP ∼ 1, the postselection prob-
ability is dominated by Cn with small values of n. How-
ever, at large distances, where the transmittance ηP ≪ 1,
the postselection probability is dominated by Cn with
large values of n. Therefore, referring to (32), the lower
bound on Fµ in the one-decoy-state protocol, calculated
by taking the difference between Pνe
ν and C0, decreases
quickly as the channel transmittance ηP decreases. On
the other hand, the lower bound of Fµ in (17) for the
two-decoy-state protocol is calculated by taking the dif-
ference between Pν1e
ν1 and Pν2e
ν2 , which are of compa-
rable values at both short and long distances. The one-
decoy-state protocol is nevertheless easy to implement.
Moreover, the one-decoy-state protocol offers boosts to
the lower bound on secure-key capacity, increasing the
secure distance and the generation rate, of a protocol
without decoy states.
It is also interesting that, independent of the number
of decoy states employed, the photon efficiency of HD-
QKD (in bpc) decreases rapidly with increasing µ. The
case of µ = 0.25 and d = 8 is insecure at only 50 km,
even when infinite decoy states are used. This implies
that the µ value employed in HD-QKD should be chosen
to ensure that the probability of multiphoton emissions
is low.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the practicality of HD-QKD proto-
cols with decoy states. In particular, we considered the
case of HD-QKD with two decoy states and with one de-
coy state. For completeness, we have also studied how
the HD-QKD would perform without decoy states.
Through simple numerical examples, we have shown
that HD-QKD with two decoy states is practical: it can
achieve multiple secure bits per coincidence at distances
over 200 km and at rates similar to those achieved by a
protocol with infinite decoy states. The HD-QKD pro-
tocol with only one decoy state is also practical at short
distances, in which case it is almost as secure as the two-
decoy-state protocol at short distances.
While we have only considered the DO-QKD protocol,
the arguments presented in this work can be generalized
to other HD-QKD protocols [12, 19]. Decoy-state HD-
QKD protocols that are robust against collective PNS
attacks can therefore be used to maximize the rate of
high-speed secure quantum communications.
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Appendix A: Eve’s Holevo information
The output state from an SPDC source in the low-
flux limit is Gaussian, and Gaussian attacks are optimal
for a given covariance matrix [22, 23]. Alice and Bob’s
time-frequency covariance matrix is therefore crucial in
estimating Eve’s Holevo information [54]. Before any in-
teraction with Eve, it is
Γ =
(
γAA γAB
γBA γBB
)
, (A1)
where the submatrices γJK for J,K = A,B are given by
γAA =
( u+v
16 −u+v8k
−u+v8k (u+v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
γAB = γ
T
BA =
( u−v
16
u−v
8k
−u−v8k − (u−v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
γBB =
(u+v
16
u+v
8k
u+v
8k
(u+v)(4k2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
(A2)
with u = 16σ2coh and v = 4σ
2
cor [18]. Note that every
entry in the covariance matrix is measured in units of
time. After Eve’s interaction, the new covariance matrix
is
Γ′ =
(
γ′AA γ
′
AB
γ′BA γ
′
BB
)
, (A3)
where the new submatrices are
γ′AA = γAA,
γ′AB = (γ
′
BA)
T =
(
1− ηt 0
0 1− ηω
)
γAB,
γ′BB =
(
1− ǫt 0
0 1− ǫω
)
γBB.
(A4)
Here, ηt and ηω represent the decrease in correlations,
while ǫt and ǫω represent the excess noise—all due to
Eve’s interactions.
Once Alice and Bob have estimated the covariance ma-
trix Γ′, we can then assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve
share a pure Gaussian state ρABE in evaluating Eve’s
Holevo information. If Alice and Bob only generate se-
cure bits from their arrival-time measurements, Eve’s
Holevo information can then be calculated from
χξt,ξω(A;E) = S(ρAB)− S(ρB|TA), (A5)
where S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log2 ρ] is the von Neumann entropy
of the quantum state ρ. S(ρAB) can then be evaluated
from S(ρAB) = f(d+) + f(d−) where
f(x) =
(
x+
1
2
)
log2
(
x+
1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
,
(A6)
and
d± =
1√
2
√
I1 ±
√
I21 − 4I2,
I1 = det[γ
′
AA] + det[γ
′
BB] + 2 det[γ
′
AB],
I2 = det Γ
′.
(A7)
Furthermore, S(ρB|TA) can be computed from
S(ρB|TA) = f
(√
det[γ′B|TA ]
)
, (A8)
where
γ′B|TA = γ
′
BB − γ′BA (Xtγ′AAXt)−1 γ′AB, (A9)
Here, Xt = ( 1 00 0 ), and the inverse is done carried out
using the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
As done in Ref. [18], we shall assume that the excess-
noise factors in the arrival-time and frequency measure-
ments to be equal, i.e. ξt = ξω = ξ. With this assump-
tion, we can make the simplification: ηt = ηω = η and
ǫt = ǫω = ǫ. Thus, we can write Alice and Bob’s covari-
ance matrix after Eve’s interaction as
Γ′ =
(
γAA (1− η)γAB
(1− η)γBA (1 + ǫ)γBB
)
. (A10)
The relationship between the three noise parameters η,
ǫ, and ξ is
ǫ =
−2η(d2 − 1/4) + ξ
d2 + 1/4
, (A11)
where d = σcoh/σcor is the Schmidt number. After Alice
and Bob estimate the value of ξ from their data, they
should then choose the values of η and ǫ that maximize
Eve’s Holevo information. The range of possible η and ǫ
satisfy not only the relationship given above but also the
following additional constraints: (a) Eve cannot increase
Alice and Bob’s mutual information by interacting with
only Bob’s photons due to the data processing inequality;
(b) the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
are greater than 1/2; and (c) Eve can only degrade Alice
and Bob’s arrival-time correlations, i.e. Var [T ′A − T ′B] >
Var [TA − TB].
Appendix B: Alice and Bob’s mutual information
We assume that Alice and Bob only generate secure
bits from their arrival-time measurements. During the
reconciliation stage, Alice and Bob postselect frames in
which each of them has at least one coincidence—either
due to dark count or due to an actual photon. The prob-
ability for their postselecting a frame is given by (4). In
some of these postselected frames, either Alice or Bob
may have registered more than one coincidence. To pre-
vent Eve from exploiting multiple-coincidence frames, Al-
ice and Bob replace such data with single coincidences
chosen randomly from a Gaussian distribution whose
variance equals the corresponding entry in the covariance
matrix Γ′ plus the timing-jitter variance. Alice and Bob’s
arrival-time measurements therefore will derive from five
different probability distributions [19] as follows.
1. Bivariate Gaussian probability distribution with
covariance matrix
Λ =
(
σ2A Cov[T
′
A, T
′
B]
Cov[T ′A, T
′
B] σ
2
B
)
, (B1)
where Cov[T ′A, T
′
B] means the covariance between
T ′A and T
′
B, i.e. the top-left entry of the submatrix
γ′AB, σ
2
A = Var[T
′
A] + σ
2
J , and σ
2
B = Var[T
′
B] + σ
2
J .
This case is a postselected frame in which Alice’s
source emitted one photon-pair and neither party
had a dark count.
2. Independent Gaussian probability distributions
with variances σ2A and σ
2
B . This case is a post-
selected frame in which one of two situations oc-
curred: (a) Alice’s source emitted multiple photon-
pairs, and Alice and Bob registered at least one co-
incidence; or (b) Alice’s source emitted one photon-
pair, and Alice and Bob registered a single coin-
cidence with at least one of them also having a
dark count. (There could be some correlations be-
tween Alice and Bob’s measurements, but—being
conservative—we are neglecting this possibility.)
3. Alice’s arrival time is a Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2A, and Bob’s arrival time is uni-
formly distributed over the measurement frame.
This case is a postselected frame in which Alice
detected at least one photon and Bob had a dark
count without detecting photons.
4. Bob’s arrival time is a Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2B, and Alice’s arrival time is uni-
formly distributed over the measurement frame.
This case is a postselected frame in which Bob de-
tected at least one photon and Alice had a dark
count without detecting photons.
5. Both Alice and Bob’s arrival times are uniformly
distributed over the measurement frame. This is
a postselected frame in which both Alice and Bob
measured dark counts without detecting photons.
The probability density functions for each of the above
cases are
pTA,TB |1( tA, tB| 1) = pBG(tA, tB; Λ), (B2a)
pTA,TB |2( tA, tB| 2) = pG(tA;σ2A)pG(tB ;σ2B), (B2b)
pTA,TB |3( tA, tB| 3) = pG(tA;σ2A)pU (tB;Tf ), (B2c)
pTA,TB |4( tA, tB| 4) = pU (tA;Tf)pG(tB;σ2B), (B2d)
pTA,TB |5( tA, tB| 5) = pU (tA;Tf)pU (tB;Tf ), (B2e)
where pBG(tA, tB; Λ) is a bivariate Gaussian probabil-
ity density function with zero means and covariance ma-
trix Λ; pG(t;σ
2) is a Gaussian probability density func-
tion with zero mean and variance σ2; and pU (t;Tf ) is
a uniform probability density function over the interval
[−Tf/2, Tf/2].
Moreover, the probabilities for each of the cases dis-
cussed above, given that a particular frame has been
postselected, are
π1 = µe
−µηAηBηP (1− pd)2/Pµ, (B3a)
π2 =
∞∑
n=2
µne−µ
n!Pµ
[1− (1 − ηA)n] [1− (1 − ηBηP )n]
+
µe−µ
Pµ
ηAηBηP pd(2− pd), (B3b)
π3 =
∞∑
n=1
µne−µ
n!Pµ
[1− (1− ηA)n] [pd(1− ηBηP )n] ,
(B3c)
π4 =
∞∑
n=1
µne−µ
n!Pµ
[pd(1− ηA)n] [1− (1− ηBηP )n] ,
(B3d)
π5 =
∞∑
n=0
µne−µ
n!Pµ
p2d(1− ηA)n(1− ηBηP )n, (B3e)
where ηA, ηB, ηP and pd have been defined in Sec. III A.
The conditional probability density functions defined
above, as well as their occurrence probabilities, allow us
to define the arrival-time joint probability density func-
tion:
pTA,TB (tA, tB) =
5∑
i=1
πi pTA,TB |i( tA, tB| i). (B4)
Using this joint probability density function, we can cal-
culate Alice and Bob’s mutual information via
I(A;B)µ =
∫
dtAdtB pTA,TB (tA, tB)
× log2
(
pTA,TB (tA, tB)
pTA(tA)pTB (tB)
)
,
(B5)
where pTA(tA) =
∫
dtB pTA,TB (tA, tB) and pTB (tB) =∫
dtA pTA,TB (tA, tB) are the marginal probability density
functions.
It is important to note that when the detector tim-
ing jitter σJ exceeds the correlation time σcor, Alice and
Bob’s mutual information I(A;B) cannot approach its
limit of log2 d. In this case, the WDM [55] that makes
σcor in each WDM channel comparable to σJ should
be applied, and secure-key must be obtained from both
arrival-time and frequency measurements.
[1] L. Zhang, C. Silberhorn, and I. A. Walmsley,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 110504 (2008).
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing (IEEE, New York, 1984) pp. 175–179.
[3] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[5] N. J. Cerf, M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, and N. Gisin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 127902 (2002).
[6] L. Sheridan and V. Scarani,
Phys. Rev. A 82, 030301 (2010).
[7] L. Sheridan and V. Scarani,
Phys. Rev. A 83, 039901(E) (2011).
[8] W. Tittel, J. Brendel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4737 (2000).
[9] R. T. Thew, A. Acin, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 010503 (2004).
[10] B. Qi, Opt. Lett. 31, 2795 (2006).
[11] I. Ali-Khan, C. J. Broadbent, and J. C. Howell,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 060503 (2007).
[12] J. Nunn, L. J. Wright, C. So¨ller, L. Zhang, I. A. Walms-
ley, and B. J. Smith, Opt. Express 21, 15959 (2013).
[13] S. Etcheverry, G. Canas, E. S. Gomez, W. A. T.
Nogueira, C. Saavedra, G. B. Xavier, and G. Lima,
Sci. Rep. 3 (2013).
[14] A. Mair, A. Vaziri, G. Weihs, and A. Zeilinger,
Nature 412, 313 (2001).
[15] A. Vaziri, G. Weihs, and A. Zeilinger,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 240401 (2002).
[16] G. Molina-Terriza, A. Vaziri, J. Rehacek, Z. Hradil, and
A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 167903 (2004).
[17] M. Mafu, A. Dudley, S. Goyal, D. Giovan-
nini, M. McLaren, M. J. Padgett, T. Konrad,
F. Petruccione, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and A. Forbes,
Phys. Rev. A 88, 032305 (2013).
[18] J. Mower, Z. Zhang, P. Desjardins, C. Lee, J. H. Shapiro,
and D. Englund, Phys. Rev. A 87, 062322 (2013).
[19] Z. Zhang, J. Mower, D. Englund, F. N. C. Wong, and
J. H. Shapiro, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 120506 (2014).
[20] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J.
Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[21] F. Grosshans, G. Van Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri, N. J.
Cerf, and P. Grangier, Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[22] M. Navascue´s, F. Grosshans, and A. Acin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 190502 (2006).
[23] R. Garcia-Patron and N. J. Cerf,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 190503 (2006).
[24] J. D. Franson, Phys. Rev. A 45, 3126 (1992).
[25] J. D. Franson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 62, 2205 (1989).
[26] I. A. Khan and J. C. Howell,
Phys. Rev. A 73, 031801 (2006).
[27] R. H. Brown and R. Q. Twiss, Nature 177, 27 (1956).
[28] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor,
Phys. Rev. A 51, 1863 (1995).
[29] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[30] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000).
[31] N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Jahma,
New Journal of Physics 4, 44 (2002).
[32] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[33] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[34] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[35] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo,
Phys. Rev. A 72, 012326 (2005).
[36] C. C. W. Lim, M. Curty, N. Walenta, F. Xu, and
H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. A 89, 022307 (2014).
[37] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, M. Fu¨rst, R. Ursin,
F. Tiefenbacher, T. Scheidl, J. Perdigues, Z. Sodnik,
C. Kurtsiefer, J. G. Rarity, A. Zeilinger, and H. We-
infurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010504 (2007).
[38] D. Rosenberg, J. W. Harrington, P. R. Rice,
P. A. Hiskett, C. G. Peterson, R. J. Hughes,
A. E. Lita, S. W. Nam, and J. E. Nordholt,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010503 (2007).
[39] X. Ma and H.-K. Lo,
New Journal of Physics 10, 073018 (2008).
[40] M. Curty, X. Ma, B. Qi, and T. Moroder,
Phys. Rev. A 81, 022310 (2010).
[41] M. Curty, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus,
Phys. Rev. A 82, 052325 (2010).
[42] B. Xu, X. Peng, and H. Guo,
Phys. Rev. A 82, 042301 (2010).
[43] Y. Zhang, W. Chen, S. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, F.-X. Xu, X.-
W. Wu, C.-H. Dong, H.-W. Li, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F.
Han, Opt. Lett. 35, 3393 (2010).
[44] S. Krapick, M. S. Stefszky, M. Jachura,
B. Brecht, M. Avenhaus, and C. Silberhorn,
Phys. Rev. A 89, 012329 (2014).
[45] Q.-C. Sun, W.-L. Wang, Y. Liu, F. Zhou, J. S. Pelc,
M. M. Fejer, C.-Z. Peng, X. Chen, X. Ma, Q. Zhang, and
J.-W. Pan, Laser Physics Letters 11, 085202 (2014).
[46] C. Lee, J. Mower, Z. Zhang, J. H. Shapiro, and D. En-
glund, Quantum Information Processing 14, 1005 (2015).
[47] C. Lee, Z. Zhang, G. R. Steinbrecher, H. Zhou, J. Mower,
T. Zhong, L. Wang, X. Hu, R. D. Horansky, V. B. Verma,
A. E. Lita, R. P. Mirin, F. Marsili, M. D. Shaw, S. W.
Nam, G. W. Wornell, F. N. C. Wong, J. H. Shapiro, and
D. Englund, Phys. Rev. A 90, 062331 (2014).
[48] T. Zhong, F. N. Wong, T. D. Roberts, and P. Battle,
Opt. Express 17, 12019 (2009).
[49] C. K. Law and J. H. Eberly,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 127903 (2004).
[50] I. Devetak and A. Winter,
Proc. Royal. Soc. A 461, 207 (2005).
[51] X.-s. Ma, S. Zotter, J. Kofler, T. Jennewein, and
A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. A 83, 043814 (2011).
[52] H. D. Riedmatten, V. Scarani, I. Marcikic,
A. Ac´ın, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin,
Journal of Modern Optics 51, 1637 (2004).
[53] F. Marsili, V. B. Verma, J. A. Stern, S. Harrington, A. E.
Lita, T. Gerrits, I. Vayshenker, B. Baek, M. D. Shaw,
R. P. Mirin, and S. W. Nam, Nat Photon 7, 210 (2013).
[54] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, N. J.
Cerf, T. C. Ralph, J. H. Shapiro, and S. Lloyd,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 84, 621 (2012).
[55] J. Mower, F. N. C. Wong, J. H. Shapiro, and D. Englund,
arXiv:1110.4867 [quant-ph].
